In this paper we introduce a modal theory Hσ which is sound and complete for arithmetical Σ1-substitutions in HA, in other words, we will show that Hσ is the Σ1-provability logic of HA. Moreover we will show that Hσ is decidable. As a by-product of these results, we show that HA + ✷⊥ has de Jongh
introduction
As far as we know, there are at least two updated reliable sources [AB04] , [BV06] , for current situation, historical background and motivations for provability logic. In order to our paper to be self-contained, in this introduction, we extract a brief backgrounds of provability logic from the mentioned sources for readers not much familiar to the subject.
provability Logic is a modal logic in which the modal operator ✷ has intended meaning of provability in some formal system. Unlike the other realms of modal logic, e.g. temporal logic, epistemic logic and deontic logic, here in provability logic, we have a rational meaning for ✷A: "A is provable in the system T ".
The notion of provability logic goes back essentially to K. Gödel [Göd33] in 1933, where he intended to provide a semantics for Heyting's formalization of intuitionistic logic IPC. He defined a translation, or interpretation τ from the propositional language to the modal language such that
The translation τ (A) adds a ✷ before each sub-formula of A. The idea behind this translation is hidden in the intuitionistic meaning of truth (the BHK interpretation): "The truth of a proposition coincides with its provability". Hence if one assume ✷A as "provability of A", then it is reasonable to add a ✷ behind each sub-formula and expect to have a correspondence between the intuitionistic propositional calculus IPC and some classical modal logic.
On the other hand, by works of Gödel in [Göd31] , for each arithmetical formula A and recursively axiomatizable theory T (like PA), we can formalize the statement "there exists a proof in T for A" by a sentence of the language of arithmetic, i.e. ∃xProv T (x, A ), where A is the code of A. Now the question is whether we can find some modal propositional theory such that the operator captures provability in classical mathematics. Let us restrict our attention to the part of mathematics known as Peano Arithmetic, PA. Hence the question is to find some propositional modal theory T ✷ such that:
T ✷ ⊢ A ⇐⇒ ∀ * PA ⊢ A * By ( ) * , we mean a mapping from the modal language to the first-order language of arithmetic, such that
• p * is an arithmetical first-order sentence, for any atomic variable p, and (⊥) * = ⊥,
• (A • B) * = A * • B * , for • ∈ {∨, ∧, →},
• ( A) * := ∃xProv PA (x, A * ).
It turned out that S4 is not a right candidate for interpreting the notion of provability, since ¬ ⊥ is a theorem of S4, contradicting Gödel's second incompleteness theorem (Peano Arthmetic, PA does not prove its own consistency).
In 1976, R. Solovay [Sol76] proved that the right modal logic, in which the operator interprets the notion of provability in PA is GL. This modal logic is well-known as the Gödel-Löb logic, and has the following axioms and rules:
• all tautologies of classical propositional logic, There are many open problems which could be assumed as a generalization of the above theorem. A list of such problems could be found in [BV06] . Also a live list of open problems could be found in the homepage of Lev Beklemishev 1 .
The question of generalizing Solovay's result from classical theories to intuitionistic ones, such as the intuitionistic counterpart of PA, well-known as Heyting Arithmetic, HA, proved to be remarkably difficult [AB04] . This problem was taken up by A. Visser, D. de Jongh and their students. The problem of axiomatizing the provability logic of HA remains a major open problem since the end of 70s [AB04] . Precisely speaking, the problem of the provability logic of HA is as follows:
Find a modal theory H such that: H ⊢ A ⇐⇒ ∀ * HA ⊢ A * Note that in the above statement of the provability logic of HA, we have (✷A) * := Prov HA ( A * ).
The following list contains important results about the provability logic of HA with arithmetical nature:
• Visser 1981. H ⊢ ✷¬¬✷A → ✷✷A and H ⊢ ✷(¬¬✷A → ✷A) → ✷(✷A ∨ ¬✷A), [Vis81, Vis82] • Iemhoff 2001. Introduced a uniform axiomatization of all known axiom schemas of H in an extended language with a bimodal operator ✄. In her Ph.D. dissertation [Iem01] , Iemhoff raised a conjecture that implies directly that her axiom system, iPH, restricted to the normal modal language, is equal to H, [Iem01] • Visser 2002. Introduced a decision algorithm for H ⊢ A, for all A not containing any atomic variable. [Vis02] In this paper we introduce an axiomatization of a modal logic H σ and prove the following result which partially answers the question. We show that for any modal proposition A, which has no nested implication to the left (TNNIL-formula), A is in the Σ 1 -provability logic of HA, iff iGL+CP ⊢ A, where iGL is the intuitionistic Gödel-Löb's logic and CP is the completeness principle B → ✷B (this theory is named in this paper as LC). This in combination with the conservativity result of Theorem 4.23 and also some variant of Visser's NNIL-algorithm in [Vis02] , implies that the Σ 1 -provability logic of HA is a decidable modal theory, that is called H σ here. More precisely, we find a system H σ such that
in which, * range over all of the substitutions that p * is a Σ 1 -sentence for atomic variables p. It is worth mentioning that a non-modal variant of all the axioms of H σ , were already discovered by Visser in [Vis81, Vis82, Vis02] . He also showed in [Vis02] that those variant of axioms of H σ are sound for Σ 1 arithmetical interpretations in HA.
Map of sections
Let us explain the content of sections and their interrelationship. All of the contents of this paper are minimally chosen for one major goal: "The completeness of H σ for arithmetical Σ 1 -substitutions, i.e. Theorem 6.4". In section 2, we give definitions of some elementary notions and also make some conventions. In section 3, we gather all the required statements with arithmetical nature. Most of the lemmas and definitions are for one purpose: proving a refinement of Leivant's principle in Lemma 3.18 (or its simplified form in Theorem 3.14). This will be used in section 5. In section 4, we collect all required notions with propositional nature. The most crucial fact we will show in this section is that in H σ , one could transform any modal proposition to another proposition with simpler form (roughly speaking with no nested implications to the left). Then we show that the theory LC, which consists of iGL plus the completeness principle and H σ prove the same TNNIL-propositions. Moreover we show that LC is sound and complete for a special class of finite Kripke models. In section 5, we show that one could transform a finite Kripke model of LC (with tree-frame) to a first-order Kripke-model of HA. This transformation is such that there is a natural correspondence between these two Kripke-models. Finally in section 6, we use the results of section 4 and section 5 to prove the completeness of H σ for arithmetical Σ 1 -substitutions. For better understanding of what is going on this paper, we propose to those readers who are somehow familiar with intuitionistic arithmetic and intuitionistic modal logics, have a look at first Example 6.1 and Example 6.2 at the beginning of the section 6.
Definitions and conventions
The propositional non-modal language, L 0 contains atomic variables, ∨, ∧, →, ⊥ and the propositional modal language, L ✷ has an additional operator ✷. In this paper, the atomic propositions (in modal or non-modal language) includes atomic variables and ⊥. For an arbitrary proposition A, Sub(A) is defined to be the set of all sub-formulae of A, including A itself. We take Sub(X) := A∈X Sub(A) for a set of propositions X. We use ✷ . A as a shorthand for A ∧ ✷A. The logic IPC is intuitionistic propositional non-modal logic over usual propositional non-modal language. The theory IPC ✷ is the same theory IPC in the extended language of propositional modal language, i.e. its language is propositional modal language and its axioms and rules are the same as the one in IPC . Because we have no axioms for ✷ in IPC ✷ , it is obvious that ✷A for each A, behaves exactly like an atomic variable inside IPC ✷ . First-order intuitionistic logic is denoted IQC and the logic CQC is its classical closure, i.e. IQC plus the principle of excluded middle. For a set of sentences and rules Γ ∪ {A} in the propositional non-modal, propositional modal or first-order language, Γ ⊢ A means that A is derivable from Γ in the system IPC, IPC ✷ , IQC, respectively. For an arithmetical formula A, A represents the Gödel number of A. For an arbitrary arithmetical theory T with a set of ∆ 0axioms, we have the ∆ 0 -predicate ProofT (x, A ), that is a formalization of "x is code of a proof for A in T ". We also have the provability predicate ProvT ( A ) := ∃x ProofT (x, A ). The set of natural numbers is denoted by ω := {0, 1, 2, . . .}. Definition 2.1. Suppose T is an recursively enumerable (r.e.) arithmetical theory and σ is a function from atomic variables to arithmetical sentences. We extend σ to all modal propositions A, inductively:
We call σ a Σ 1 -substitution, if for every atomic A, σ(A) is a Σ 1 -formula.
Definition 2.2. The provability logic of a sufficiently strong theory, T is defined to be a modal propositional theory PL(T ) such that PL(T ) ⊢ A iff for all arithmetical substitutions σ, T ⊢ σ T (A). If we restrict the substitutions to Σ 1 -substitutions, then the new modal theory is PL σ (T ). Lemma 2.3. Let A(p 1 , . . . , p n ) be a non-modal proposition with p i = p j for all 0 < i < j ≤ n. Then for all modal sentences B 1 , . . . , B n with B i = B j for 0 < i < j ≤ n we have:
Proof. By simple inductions on complexity of proofs in IPC and IPC ✷ .
✷
We define NOI (No Outside Implication) as the set of modal propositions A, such that any occurrence of → is in the scope of some ✷. To be able to state an extension of Leivant's Principle (that is adequate to axiomatize Σ 1 -provability logic of HA) we need a translation on the modal language which we name Leivant's translation. We define it recursively as follows:
• A l := A for atomic or boxed A,
Definition 2.4. Minimal provability logic iGL, is same as Gödel-Löb provability logic GL , without the principle of excluded middle, i.e. it has the following axioms and rules:
• The theorems of IPC ✷ .
• Necessitation Rule: A/✷A,
iK4 is iGL without Löb's axiom. Note that we can get rid of the necessitation rule by adding ✷A to the axioms, for each axiom A in the above list. We will use this fact later in this paper. We list the following axiom schemas:
• the Completeness Principle: CP := A → ✷A.
• Restricted Completeness Principle to atomic formulae: CP a := p → ✷p, for atomic p.
• Extended Leivant's Principle:
We define theories LC := iGL + CP and LLe + := iGL + Le + + CP a . Note that in the presence of CP and modus ponens, the necessitation rule is superfluous. Later we will find a Kripke semantics for LC and also we will see that LC and LLe + proves the same formulae w.r.t. a class of restricted complexity, to wit TNNIL.
Arithmetic
In this section, we gather some preliminaries from intuitionistic arithmetic. Mostly we will prove some refinements of well-known theorems such as: Π 2 -conservativity of PA over HA, Gödel's diagnolization lemma and Σ 1 -completeness of HA. Most of these preliminaries will be used to prove a refinement of Leivant 
Some arithmetical preliminaries
The first-order language of arithmetic contains three functions (successor, addition and multiplication), one predicate symbol and a constant: (S, +, ., <, 0). First-order intuitionistic arithmetic (HA) is the theory over IQC with the axioms:
Ind: For each formula A(x):
In which UC(B) is the universal closure of B.
Peano Arithmetic PA, has the same axioms of HA over CQC.
Notation 3.1. ¿From now on, when we are working in first-order language of arithmetic, for a first-order sentence A, ✷A and ✷ + A are shorthand for ProvHA ( A ) and ProvPA ( A ) , respectively. Let iΣ 1 be the theory HA, where the induction principle is restricted to Σ 1 -formulae. We also define the theories HA x to be the theory with axioms of HA, in which the induction principle is restricted to formulas satisfying one of the following conditions:
• formulas of the form (A → B) → B in which A and B are Σ 1 .
• formulas with Gödel number less than x.
We can define similar concept for PA x . Note that classically, formulas of the form (A → B) → B in which A and B are Σ 1 , are equivalent to the Σ 1 -formula A ∨ B and hence PA 0 is the well-known theory IΣ 1 . We also define ✷ x A and ✷ + x A to be Prov HAx ( A ) and Prov PAx ( A ), respectively. We recall that a function f on ω :
It is well known that all primitive recursive functions are provably total in IΣ 1 with a ∆ 0 -formula as defining formula. So we may use primitive recursive function symbols in the language of arithmetic with their defining axioms (as far as we work in IΣ 1 ).
Proof. This is an immediate consequence of Π 2 -conservativity of PA over HA. [TvD88] (3.3.4). ✷ Lemma 3.3. For any ∆ 0 -formula A(x), we have HA 0 ⊢ ∀x(A(x) ∨ ¬A(x)).
Proof. This is well-known in the literature. ✷
The Gödel-Gentzen translation associates a formula A g to any formula A in a first-order language, and is defined inductively by the following items:
• A g := A, for atomic A,
• (∀xA) g := ∀xA g ,
The Friedman translation associates a formula A C , for an arbitrary formula C, to any formula A in a first-order language. Roughly speaking, A C is the result of adding C as a disjunct to all atomic sub-formulas of A. To define A C , we assume that free variables of C do not appear as bound variables of A. It is obvious that we can always take care of this detail by renaming bound variables of A to fresh variables.
As shown in [TvD88] , we have the following properties for Gödel-Gentzen and Friedman translations:
• For each Σ 1 -formula A in the language of arithmetic, HA ⊢ A g ↔ ¬¬A and HA ⊢ A C ↔ (A∨C).
• For any A in the language of arithmetic, CQC ⊢ A implies IQC ⊢ A g .
• HA 0 is closed under Friedman's translation with respect to Σ 1 -formulas. i.e. for any Σ 1 -formula B and any A, HA 0 ⊢ A implies HA 0 ⊢ A B . Actually in [TvD88] , this property is proved for HA instead of HA 0 , but this case is very similar to that one.
We have the following variant of Lemma 3.2. Let G be the function that assigns to n the Gödel number of F (n). We use A(ẋ) as a term for G. We may omit the dot over variables when no confusion is likely.
Lemma 3.5. For every formula A(x, x 1 . . . , x n ) with free variables exactly as shown, there exists a formula B(x 1 , . . . , x n ) such that
Proof. It is easy to see that the usual proof of the Fixed Point lemma holds in this setting. ✷
The following lemma, states the Σ 1 -completeness of HA 0 .
Lemma 3.6. HA 0 proves all true Σ 1 sentences. Moreover this argument is formalizable and provable in HA 0 , i.e. for every
Proof. It is a well-known fact that any true (in standard model N) Σ 1 -sentence is provable in iΣ 1 . Moreover this argument is constructive and formalizable in iΣ 1 . ✷ Lemma 3.7. For every formula A, we have PA ⊢ ∀x ✷ + (✷ + x A → A) and HA ⊢ ∀x ✷(✷ x A → A). Proof. The case of PA is well known. For the case HA, see [Smo73b] or Theorem 8.1 in [Vis02] . ✷
Coding of finite sequences
We use some fixed method for encoding of finite sequences and use x 1 , . . . , x n as the code of the finite sequence (x 1 , . . . , x n ). We assume here that the encoding is a one-one correspondence between natural numbers and the assiciated finite sequences. For details on coding of finite sequences, we refer the reader to [Smo85] , Chapter 0. Let x = x 0 , x 1 , . . . , x n and y = y 0 , y 1 , . . . , y m . The following notations are used in this paper:
• lth(x) is defined as the length of the sequence with the code x, i.e. here lth(x) := n + 1,
• x * y := x 0 , . . . , x n , y 0 , . . . , y m ,
• (x) i is defined (if i < lth(x)) as the i-th element in the sequence with the code x, i.e. here (x) i := x i . If also i ≥ lth(x), we define (x) i := 0,
•x is defined as the final element of the sequence with the code x, i.e. herex := (x) lth(x)−1 ,
• x is an initial segment of y (x ⊆ i y) if lth(x) ≤ lth(y) and for all j < lth(x), we have (x) j = (y) j .
Kripke models of HA
A first-order Kripke model for HA is a triple K = (K, <, M) such that:
• The frame of K, i.e. (K, <), is a non-empty partially ordered set,
• M is a function from K to the first-order classical structures for the language of the arithmetic, i.e. M(α) is a first-order classical structure, for each α ∈ K,
• For any α ≤ β ∈ K, M(α) is an elementary (weak) substructure of M(β).
For any α ∈ K and first-order formula A ∈ L α (the language of arithmetic augmented with constant symbolsā for each a ∈ |M(α)|), we define K, α A (or simply α A, if no confusion is likely) inductively as follows:
• For atomic A, α A iff M(α) |= A. Note that in the structure M(α),ā is interpreted as a,
• If A is conjunction, disjunction or implication, α A as in modal propositional case (see subsection 4.5),
It is well-known in the literature that HA is complete for first-order Kripke models.
Lemma 3.8. Let K = (K, <, M) be a Kripke model of HA and A be an arbitrary Σ 1 -formula. Then for each α ∈ K, we have α A iff M(α) |= A.
Proof. Use induction on the complexity of A to show that for each β ∈ K, we have β A iff M(β) |= B. In the inductive step for → and ∀, use Lemma 3.3. ✷
q-Realizability and Leivant's principle
A variant of realizability introduced by Kleene, is q-realizability (see [TvD88] ) which is defined inductively for arithmetical formula A as follows:
In above definition j 1 , j 2 are inverses for a one-to-one onto, pairing function, j, such that x = j(j 1 (x), j 2 (x)). Also Txyu is Kleene's predicate formalizing "u is a computation for the Turing Machine with code x with input y", and U is the result extractor function, i.e. if u is a computation for a Turing Machine, then U(u) is its output.
Lemma 3.9. For any formula A we have HA 0 ⊢ x q A → A.
Proof. See [TvD88] . ✷ In the following, {x} is partial recursive function of Turing Machine with code x. The notation {x}y↓ means that "The function {x} is defined on input y", or equivalently "The Turing machine with code x halts with input y". It is well known that {x}y↓ is a Σ 1 sentence. We use terms which contain some Kleene's bracket notation. In that case, we use t↓ to mean that all the brackets in t are defined (terminate). One immediate consequence of q-realizability, is Church's Rule for HA:
Lemma 3.10. For every formula A(x, y), if HA ⊢ ∀x ∃y A(x, y), then there exists some n ∈ ω such that HA ⊢ ∀x ({n}(x) ↓ ∧ A(x, {n}(x))).
Proof. See [TvD88] . ✷ It is easy to observe that "HA ⊢ A" implies "there exists some n such that HA ⊢ n q A"([TvD88]). The point of the following lemma is that we can actually compute this n from the (code of) proof of A in HA and moreover we can formalize this argument in HA:
Lemma 3.11. Suppose that A(x 1 , . . . , x m ) is an arithmetical formula with free variables as shown.
Then, there exists a provably (in HA) total recursive function f such that:
Proof. The proof is very similar to the proof of the soundness part of [TvD88, Theorem 4.10] . First define f (n) in this way:
is a primitive recursive function that will be defined later in the proof. Let's fix some sequence of numbers m. With induction on the complexity of the proof HA n ⊢ A(m), we show that (by A(m), we mean A[x : m])
HA ⊢ "HA n ⊢ A(m)" → " there exists some number k such that HA f (n) ⊢ k q A(m)"
We only treat the case that A is an instance of induction schema. All the other cases are trivial and left to reader. Assume that B < n and
We should find some k such that
By definition of q-realizability, we have:
Since f (n) ≥ n, we have HA f (n) ⊢ A(m). Hence it remains only to show that HA f (n) ⊢ C. Define the primitive recursive function t(u) in the following way. For any given u, t(u) is the code of the Turing Machine that fulfills the following conditions:
Finally, let k be the code of the Turing Machine that computes the prmitive recursive function t. Now it is not defiicult to observe that, by induction on B q,x , one could deduce C in HA 0 , and hence HA f (n) ⊢ C. This implies HA f (n) ⊢ A(m), as desired. ✷ Lemma 3.12. For every sentence A, there exists some provably (in HA) total recursive function h A such that HA ⊢ ∀x ✷ hA(x) (✷ẋA → A).
Proof. By Lemma 3.7 we have HA ⊢ ∀x ∃y ✷ y (✷ẋA → A). Now we have the desired result by use of Lemma 3.10. ✷ Lemma 3.13. Suppose that A(x 1 , . . . , x m ) is a Σ 1 -formula with variables as shown. Then there exists some nA ∈ N, such that
Proof. This theorem for r-realizability instead of q-realizability is proved in [TvD88] (Proposition 4.4.5). The proof for q-realizability is quite similar and we leave it to the reader. ✷
It is well-known that the disjunction property holds for IPC and HA, however it is also shown that in case of HA , the proof is not formalizable in HA, i.e. HA ✷(A ∨ B) → (✷A ∨ ✷B). But this is not the end of story! Daniel Leivant in his PhD dissertation [Lei75] showed that HA ⊢ ✷(A∨B) → ✷(A ∨ ✷B). Albert Visser in an unpublished paper showed that we can extend Leivant's principle to the following version. For every Σ 1 -sentence A, HA ⊢ ✷(A → (B ∨ C)) → ✷(A → (✷B ∨ C)). In the following lemma, we will show that we can find (constructively) from the code x of the proof
Although the statement of this theorem would not be used later in this paper, we bring it here for better understanding of its generalization in a more technical lemma, i.e. Lemma 3.17.
Theorem 3.14. For arbitrary sentences A, B, C such that A ∈ Σ 1 , there exists a provably (in HA) total recursive function f such that
Proof. First observe that, by Lemma 3.13, there exists some finite number nA ∈ N such that HA ⊢ A → ({nA } ↓ ∧ {nA } q A). We set t 0 := {nA } . Hence there exists some n 0 ∈ N such that
We work inside HA. Assume ✷ x (A → (B ∨ C)). By Lemma 3.11, there exists some z such that ✷ g0(x) ({ż} ↓ ∧ {ż} q (A → (B ∨ C))), in which g 0 is the recursive function provided by Lemma 3.11. We define t 1 := {ż} and hence we have ✷ g0(x) t 1 ↓. If we set g 1 (y) := g 0 (y) + n 0 , by
Then, by definition of q-realizability, we have:
Again by Lemma 3.6 and Lemma 3.9,
Since atomic formulae are decidable in HA, so for any atomic formulae D, there exists some finite n 2 such that in HA n2 we have decidability of D.
The extended Leivant's Principle
In this section, we study properties of the extended Leivant's principle, Le + . We prove that for any Σ 1 -substitution σ, HA ⊢ σ HA (LLe + ). Define a translation q σ (A, x) recursively for a modal proposition A and a Σ 1 -substitution σ, as follows:
Lemma 3.15. Let A be a modal proposition and t be a term in first-order language of arithmetic which possibly contain Kleene's brackets. Then
Proof. Proof of both parts are by induction on the complexity of A. ✷ For the next lemma, we need some auxiliary notation σ l (A, x). Informally speaking, σ l (A, x) is going to be σ HA (A l ) with one difference. The new added boxes in A l should be interpreted as provability in HA x . More precisely, we define it inductively as the following.
• A is atomic or boxed. σ l (A, x) := σ HA (A),
Lemma 3.16. Let A be a modal proposition. Then
Proof. Use induction on A. ✷ Lemma 3.17. Let A be a modal proposition, D be any Σ 1 -sentence and t be a term in first-order language of arithmetic which possibly contain Kleene's brackets. Then there exists a provably total recursive function f such that
Proof. We use induction on A. For simplicity of notations, we assume here that t is a normal term. One can build the general case easily.
Atomic, Boxed or conjunction: Trivial.
Then by definition of q σ , we have
Hence by the induction hypothesis, there exists functions g and h such that
Let f (x) be the maximum of g(x) and h(x). Finally, one can use Σ 1 -completeness of HA 0 (Lemma 3.6) and Lemma 3.16 to derive
Implication. Assume that A = B → C. If B ∈ NOI, by Lemma 3.15, we are done. So assume that B ∈ NOI. By definition of q σ , there exists some term t 1 such that
Since B ∈ NOI, σ HA (B) is a Σ 1 -formula. Hence by the induction hypothesis, there exists some function f such that
This by definition of σ l (B → C, f (x)), implies the desired result. ✷ Lemma 3.18. For any Σ 1 -substitution σ and modal proposition A, there exists some provably total recursive function g such that
Proof. Work inside HA. Assume ✷ x σ HA (A). By Lemma 3.11, there exists some y such that
in which t := {y} and f 0 is a provably total recursive function as stated in Lemma 3.11. Hence by the first item of Lemma 3.15, ✷ f0(x) (t↓ ∧q σ (A, t)). Hence by Lemma 3.17, we have the function f
Proof. Let A be a modal proposition. We must show HA ⊢ ✷σ HA (A) → ✷σ HA (A l ). Now the desired result may be deduced by Lemma 3.18 and the second item of Lemma 3.16. ✷
Although there are other ways of proving the above theorem (see [Vis02] or [Iem01] ), we need its major preliminary lemma (i.e. Lemma 3.18) in the proof of the completeness theorem. Specially, we use Lemma 3.18 in the proof of Lemma 5.11.
Interpretability
Let T and S be two first-order theories. Informally speaking, we say that T interprets S (T ✄ S) if there exists a translation from the language of S to the language of T such that T proves the translation of all of the theorems of S. For a formal definition see [Vis98] . It is well-known that for recursive theories T, S containing PA, the assertion T ✄ S is formalizable in first-order language of arithmetic. For two arithmetical sentence A, B, we use the notation A ✄ B to mean that PA + A interprets PA + B. The following theorem due to Orey, first appeared in [Fef60] .
Theorem 3.20. For recursive theories T and S containing PA, we have:
in which S x is the restriction of the theory S to axioms with Gödel number ≤ x and Con(U ) := ¬ ✷ U ⊥.
Proof. See [Fef60] . p.80 or [Ber90] . ✷ Convention. ¿From above theorem, one can easily observe that
, even when we are working in weaker theories like HA. We remind the reader that ✷ + stands for provability in PA.
Propositional modal logics
In this section, we collect all the required notions with propositional flavour. This section is mostly devoted to provide an axiomatic system for the Σ 1 -provability logic of HA, i.e. H σ , and stating some of its essential properties that we need them later in the proof of soundness (Theorem 6.3) or completeness (Theorem 6.4) of H σ for arithmetical Σ 1 -substitutions. The following are some of important results that will be used in the proof of completeness theorem.
• In subsection 4.3, it is shown that the axiomatic system H σ is capable of simplifying any modal proposition to an equivalent TNNIL − proposition (Corollary 4.18). This fact is useful for proof of the completeness theorem (Theorem 6.4).
• In subsection 4.4, the TNNIL-conservativity of a stronger theory LC over H σ (Theorem 4.23) is proved. This conservativity plays an important role in the proof of completeness theorem. As far as working with TNNIL-formulas, we get rid of all those complicated axioms of H σ and just use the more handful theory LC.
• In subsection 4.5, we will prove the finite model property for the theory LC (Theorem 4.25). With the aid of our main theorem in next section (Theorem 5.1), such finite counter-models are used to be transformed to a first-order counter-models of HA.
The NNIL formulae and related topics
The class of No Nested Implications to the Left, NNIL formulae in a propositional language was introduced in [VvBdJRdL95] , and more explored in [Vis02] . The crucial result of [Vis02] is providing an algorithm that as input, receives a non-modal proposition A and returns its best NNIL approximation A * from below, i.e., IPC ⊢ A * → A and for all NNIL formula B such that
• In subsubsection 4.1.1, we state Visser's NNIL-algorithm for computing A * , and some of its useful properties.
• In subsubsection 4.1.2, we explain the extension of this algorithm to the modal language (the TNNIL-algorithm), which computes A + and is essentially the same as the NNIL-algorithm with this extra rule: treat inside ✷ as a fresh proposition, i.o.w. in the inductive definition of the algorithm (✷A) + := ✷A + . Then we prove some useful properties of TNNIL-algorithm: Lemma 4.6 and Corollary 4.7. The best feature of TNNIL-algorithm is that for all Σ 1 -substitutions σ, we have HA ⊢ σ HA (✷A ↔ ✷A + ) (first part of Corollary 4.7).
• In subsubsection 4.1.3, we define another algorithm TNNIL − for computing A − , which is essentially the same as the TNNIL-algorithm, with this minor difference: Only treat those sub-formulae which are boxed and leave the others. With this minor change, we even have a better feature for A − , i.e., for all Σ 1 -substitutions σ, we have HA ⊢ σ HA (A ↔ A − ) (Lemma 4.9).
Now we define the class NNIL of modal propositions precisely by NNIL := {A | ρA ≤ 1}, in which the complexity measure ρ, is defined inductively as follows:
• ρ(✷A) = ρ(p) = ρ(⊥) = ρ(⊤) = 0, for an arbitrary atomic variables p and modal proposition A,
In the following, we define an special complexity measure o(.) on modal propositions. We need this measure for termination of the NNIL-algorithm.
Definition 4.1. Let D be a modal proposition. Let
where |X| is the number of elements of X.
• cD := the number of occurrences of logical connectives which are not in the scope of a ✷.
• dD := the maximum number of nested boxes. To be more precise,
-dD := 0 for atomic D,
-d✷D := dD + 1,
• oD := (dD, iD, cD).
We order the measures oD lexicographically, i.e.,
For the definition of NNIL-algorithm, we use the bracket notation [A]B of [Vis02] . We also use a variant of this notation, [A] ′ B, which implicitly were used in [Vis02] : 
The NNIL-algorithm
For each modal proposition A, the proposition A * is produced by induction on complexity measure oA as follows: [Vis02] 1. A is atomic or boxed, take A * := A.
we have several sub-cases. In the following, an occurrence of E in D is called an outer occurrence, if E is neither in the scope of an implication nor in the scope of a boxed formula.
(a) C contains an outer occurrence of a conjunction. In this case, there is some formula J(q) such that
• q is a propositional variable not occurring in A.
• q is outer in J and occurs exactly once.
contains an outer occurrence of a disjunction. In this case, there is some formula J(q) such that
X and C = Y and X, Y are sets of implications or atoms. We have several sub-cases:
i. X contains atomic variables or boxed formula B. We set D := (X \ {B}) and take
otherwise, first set A 1 := [B] ′ Z and then take 
The above defined algorithm is not deterministic, however by the following theorem we know that
Theorem 4.4. For each modal proposition A, 1. NNIL algorithm with input A terminates and the output formula A * , is an NNIL proposition such that IPC ✷ ⊢ A * → A.
IPC
3. A * is the best NNIL approximation of A from below i.e. IPC ✷ ⊢ A * → A and for each NNIL
Proof. ✷σ(B) . This implies that HA ⊢ ✷(σ(A)) ↔ ✷σ(A * ). Now for a modal proposition A, suppose that A ′ (p 1 , . . . , p n ) and B 1 , . . . , B n be such that A = A ′ [p 1 |B 1 , . . . , p n |B n ] in which A ′ is a non-modal proposition and p 1 , . . . , p n are fresh atomic variables (not occurred in A). Let σ ′ be the substitution defined by σ ′ (p i ) := σ(B i ), for each 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and for any other atomic variable q, σ ′ (q) = σ(q). Clearly, σ ′ is again a Σ 1 -substitution and hence we have • TNNIL contains all atomic propositions,
• if all → occurring in A are contained in the scope of a ✷ (or equivalently A ∈ NOI) and A, B ∈ TNNIL, then A → B ∈ TNNIL.
Finally we define TNNIL − as the set of all the propositions like A(✷B 1 , . . . , ✷B n ), such that A(p 1 , . . . , p n ) is an arbitrary non-modal proposition and B 1 , . . . , B n ∈ TNNIL.
Here we define A + as TNNIL-formula approximating A. The major difference between A + and A * is that IPC ✷ ⊢ A + → A may not hold any more. Informally speaking, to find A + , we first compute A * and then replace all outer boxed formula ✷B in A by ✷B + . To be more accurate, we define A + by induction on dA. Suppose that for all B with dB < dA, we have defined B + . Suppose that A ′ (p 1 , . . . , p n ) and ✷B 1 , . . . , ✷B n such that A = A ′ [p 1 |✷B 1 , . . . , p n |✷B n ] where A ′ is a non-modal proposition and p 1 , . . . , p n are fresh atomic variables (not occurred in A). It is clear that dB i < dA and then we can define A + := (A ′ ) * [p 1 |✷B + 1 , . . . , p n |✷B + n ].
Lemma 4.6. For every modal proposition B,
Proof. We prove first part by induction on complexity of proof iGL ⊢ B. Proof of the second part is similar to the first one.
• B is an axiom. 
iGL ⊢
Proof. The first assertion can be deduced simply by induction on dA and using Theorem 4.4(6).
To prove the second part, first note that by Theorem 4.4(4), if
By Lemma 2.3, we can replace each outer occurrence of boxed formulae by arbitrary propositions, in particular, by their TNNIL approximations. Then by definition of A + , we have
. Proof of the third part is direct consequence of the second part. Then the new algorithm also halts, and for any modal proposition A, we have iK4 ⊢ A † ↔ A + .
The Box Translation
The following definition of the box-translation, is essentially from ([Vis82, Def.4.1]). The boxtranslation extends the well-known Gödel-McKinsey-Tarski translation. In this subsection, we prove that iGL is closed under box-translation (Proposition 4.16).
Definition 4.12. For every proposition A in the modal propositional language, we associate a proposition A ✷ , called the box-translation of A, defined inductively as follows:
Lemma 4.13. For any modal proposition A, we have iK4 ⊢ A ✷ → ✷A ✷ .
Proof. Easy induction over the complexity of A. ✷
In the following lemma we state some properties of ✷ . .
Lemma 4.14. For each modal sentences A, B and C, the following propositions are provable in iK4.
Proof. The first part is easily deduced in iK4. For the second one deduce from Lemma 4.13. ✷ Proof. The proof can be carried out in three steps:
1. For any proposition A first we show that IPC ✷ ⊢ A implies iK4 ⊢ A ✷ . This can be done by a routine induction on the length of the proof in IPC. Note that for any axiom A of IPC, we have iK4 ⊢ A ✷ . As for the rule of modus ponens, suppose that IPC ✷ ⊢ A and IPC ✷ ⊢ A → B. By induction hypothesis, then iK4 ⊢ A ✷ and iK4 ⊢ (
Observe that the box translation of an instance of Löb's axiom L, is also an instance of L. ✷
Axiomatizing the TNNIL-algorithm
In this subsection we present axioms which we need for the TNNIL − -algorithm (.) − . More precisely, we will find some axiom set X such that X ⊢ A − ↔ A.
To do that, we use some relation ◮ between modal propositions. A variant of this relation for non-modal case first came in [Vis02] . The relation ◮ is defined to be the smallest relation on modal propositional sentences satisfying: Notation. In the rest of the paper, we use A ≡ B as a shorthand for iK4 ⊢ A ↔ B.
The following theorem, shows that A1-A4 and B1-B3, axiomatize the TNNIL algorithm:
Theorem 4.17. For any modal proposition A, we have A ◮◭ A + .
Proof. We prove the desired result by induction on o(A). Suppose we have the desired result for each proposition B with o(B) < o(A). We treat A by the following cases.
(A1)
A is atomic. Then A + = A, by definition, and result holds trivially.
2. (A1-A4, B1) A = ✷B, A = B ∧ C, A = B ∨ C. All these cases hold by induction hypothesis.
In boxed case, we use of induction hypothesis and A4. In conjunction, we use of A1-A3 and in disjunction we use A1,A2 and B1.
3. A = B → C. There are several sub-cases. similar to definition of NNIL-algorithm, an occurrence of a sub-formula B of A is said to be an outer occurrence in A, if it is neither in the scope of a ✷ nor in the scope of →.
(a) (A1-A3) C contains an outer occurrence of a conjunction. We can treat this case using induction hypothesis and TNNIL-algorithm.
(b) (A1-A3) B contains an outer occurrence of a disjunction. We can treat this case by induction hypothesis and TNNIL-algorithm.
(c) B = X and C = Y , where X and Y are sets of implications, atoms and boxed formulae. We have several sub-cases:
i. (A1-A3, B3) X contains atomic variables. Let p be an atomic variable in X. Set D := (X \ {p}). Then A + ≡ p → (D → C) + . On the other hand, we have by induction hypothesis and A1,A2 and B3, that p → (D → C) + ◮◭ p → (D → C).
Finally by A1 and A2 we have A + ◮◭ A.
ii. (A1-A3, B3) X contains boxed formula. Similar to the previous case. iii. (A1, A2) X contains ⊤ or ⊥. Trivial. iv. (A1-A3, B2) X contains only implications. This case needs the axiom B2 and it seems to be the interesting case. By the definition of A + , depending on o([B]Z) < o(A) or not, respectively we have: 
We show that for each E ∈ Z, It is clearly the case that LC ⊇ LLe + . One can use Kripke models (from the next section) to show ¬¬✷⊥ ∈ LC \ LLe + . This implies that the inclusion is strict. As we will see later in this section, LC and LLe + have same TNNIL-theorems. To prove this, we need some lemmas.
Lemma 4.19. iK4 ⊢ Le + → Le.
Proof. Assume some axiom instance of Le, ✷(B ∨ C) → ✷(✷B ∨ C). Let A := B ∨ C. By axiom schema Le + , we have ✷A → ✷A l , which is
Lemma 4.20. For each modal proposition A,
Proof. Proof of parts 1,2 and 3 are routine by induction on A. Part 4 is deduced from part 2, i.e, we have ✷A l → ✷A, by part 2 and ✷A l ← ✷A is exactly Le + . ✷ Lemma 4.21. For any TNNIL formula A, we have
Proof. We prove all parts by induction on the complexity of A, simultaneously. In the middle of proof, when we are using induction hypothesis of part i, 1 ≤ i ≤ 4, we mention the number in parenthesis that number and also when we deduce some part of lemma, we also mention the number of that part in parentheses as well. 
, and induction hypothesis (part
. This implies, again by properties of ✷ . , the desired result, 
Kripke semantics for LC
Let us first review results and notations from [Iem01] which will be used here. Assume two binary relations R and S on a set. Define α(R; S)γ iff there exists some β such that αRβ and βSγ. A Kripke model K, for intuitionistic modal logic, is a quadruple (K, <, R, V ), such that K is a set (we call its elements as nodes), (K, <) is a partial ordering, R is a binary relation on K such that (≤; R) ⊆ R, and V is a binary relation between nodes and atomic variables such that αV p and α ≤ β implies βV p. Then we can extend V to all modal language with R corresponding to ✷ and ≤ for intuitionistic →. More precisely, we define inductively as an extension of V as the following.
• K, α p iff αV p, for atomic variable p,
• K, α ⊥ and K, α ⊤,
• K, α ✷A iff for all β with αRβ, we have K, β A.
In the rest of paper, we may simply write α A instead of K, α A, if no confusion is likely. By an induction on the complexity of A, one can observe that α A implies β A for all A and α ≤ β. We define the following notions.
• If α ≤ β, β is called to be above α and α is beneath β. If αRβ, β is called to be a successor of α. We define R(α) to be the set of all successors of β.
• A Kripke model is finite if its set of nodes is finite. A Kripke model is tree-frame if its set of nodes with ordering ≤ is a tree.
• A Kripke model K = (K, <, R, V ) is reverse well-founded iff K is well-founded with the ordering R −1 .
• K is called brilliant iff (R; ≤) ⊆ R.
• K is called perfect iff it is brilliant, reverse well-founded and R ⊆<.
• Suppose X is a set of propositions that is closed under sub-formula (we call such X to be adequate). An X-saturated set of propositions Γ with respect to some theory T is a subset of X that
Lemma 4.24. Let T A and let X be an adequate set. Then there is an X-saturated set Γ such that T ∩ X ⊆ Γ A.
Proof. See [Iem01] . ✷ Theorem 4.25. LC is sound and complete for finite perfect Kripke models with tree frames.
Proof. Soundness part can easily be proved by induction on the complexity of formulae. For the completeness, we first find some finite perfect Kripke counter-model for each A with LC A, and then convert it to a perfect Kripke model with finite tree frame. Assume LC A. Let Sub(A) be the set of sub-formulae of A. Then define
It is obvious that X is a finite adequate set. We define K = (K, < R, V ) as follows. Take K as the set of all X-saturated sets with respect to LC, and ≤ is the subset relation over K. Define αRβ iff for all ✷B ∈ X, ✷B ∈ α implies B ∈ β, and also there exists some ✷C ∈ β \ α. Finally define αV p iff p ∈ α, for atomic p.
It only remains showing that K is a finite perfect Kripke model that refutes A. To do this, we first show by induction on B ∈ X that b ∈ α iff α B, for each α ∈ K. The only non-trivial case is B = ✷C. Let ✷C ∈ α. We must show α ✷C. The other direction is easier to prove and we leave it to reader. Let β 0 := {D ∈ X | α ⊢ ✷D}. If β 0 , ✷C ⊢ C, then, by definition of β 0 , we have α ⊢ ✷β 0 and hence by Löb's axiom, α ⊢ ✷C, contradicting ✷C ∈ α. Hence β 0 , ✷C C and so there exists some X-saturated set β such that β C, β ⊇ β 0 ∪ {✷C}. Hence β ∈ K and αRβ. Then by induction hypothesis, β C and hence α ✷C.
Since LC A, by Lemma 4.24, there exists some X-saturated set α ∈ K such that α A, and hence by the above argument we have α A. K trivially satisfies all the properties of perfect Kripke model. As a sample, we show that why R ⊆< holds. Assume αRβ and let B ∈ α. If B is boxed formula, like C, then by definition, C ∈ β and hence β ⊢ B and we are done. So assume B is not a boxed formula. Then by definition of X, we have ✷B ∈ X and by the completeness axiom in LC, we have α ⊢ ✷B and hence by definition of R, it is the case that B ∈ β. This shows α ⊆ β and hence α ≤ β. But α is not equal to β, because αRβ implies existence of some ✷C ∈ β \ α. Hence α < β, as desired. Now we explain how to convert K to a Kripke model T := (T, < t , R t , V t ) A with tree frame. Let T be the set of all finite (excluding empty sequence) sequences α 1 , α 2 , . . . , α n such that α 1 < α 2 < . . . < α n . Let < t be the initial segment relation. For any α ∈ T , let f (α) be the final element of sequence. Then we define αR t β iff f (α)Rf (β), for non-empty α and β. Finally, define αV t p, for atomic p, iff f (α)V p. Now one can prove by induction on B, that for any
Proof. Let A be given. Assume that n is the number of elements of X defined in the above proof.
It shows us that we should only check if for all Kripke models K with 2 n nodes (only over atomic variables that appear in A), we have K A. If that was the case, we say "yes" to LC ⊢ A?, otherwise the answer is "no" to LC ⊢ A?. ✷
Relation to intuitionistic non-modal Kripke models
The usual intuitionistic non-modal Kripke models are the same Kripke models as is defined above, without the additional relation R. Extending it to all non-modal propositions is the same as the one for modal language. It is well-known that IPC is sound and complete for non-modal Kripke models. We have the following conservativity result. Sol76] ) showed that one could simulate the behaviour of a Kripke model of classical modal logic inside PA. However, the combination of these two ideas could be assumed as major obstacle towards the characterization of the provability logic of HA. In this section, we will show that one could simulate the behaviour of some special kind of Kripke models for intuitionistic modal logic, i.e. perfect Kripke models, by first-order Kripkemodels of HA. This would lead us to the characterization of the Σ 1 -provability logic of HA. More precisely, we will prove the following theorem.
Theorem 5.1. Let K 0 = (K 0 , R 0 , < 0 , V 0 ) be a finite perfect Kripke model with tree frame and Γ ⊆ TNNIL − be a finite set. Then there exists some arithmetical Σ 1 -substitution σ and a Kripke model K 1 = (K 0 , < 0 , M) such that for all A ∈ Γ and α ∈ K 0 we have K 0 , α A iff K 1 , α σ HA (A).
Before we continue with the rather long proof of Theorem 5.1, that will take up whole of this section, let us explain the outline of the proof.
First we define a recursive function F (the Solovay function) with the domain of natural numbers. F (0) is defined to be some fresh node α 0 . The function F , always climbs over the frame (K 0 , R 0 , < 0 ), but it is reluctant to do so. It only goes to some node β at some stage n + 1 (i.e. F (n + 1) = β), if n + 1 is a witness (in some sense which would be clarified in this section) for this statement "F is not going to stay in β forever or ¬σ HA (✷ϕ β )".
In this definition, ϕ β is the conjunction of all sentences in the set S = {B ∈ Sub(Γ) | B ∈ TNNIL} such that β ϕ β . Here, Sub(Γ) is the set of sub-formulas of some formula in Γ. The most interesting (and difficult part to prove as well) property of the function F is that this function actually (in the standard model of arithmetic N) does not climb over tree at all, i.e. the function F is constant, N |= ∀xF (x) = α 0 . In contrast with the classical case, proving this fact for the intuitionistic case is rather complicated.
Let L α denote "the function F would go above α or remain equal to α". Then we define the substitution σ(p) := α p L α. Then we define the I-frame I = (K 0 , < 0 , T ), where T α is defined to be PA plus the following statement: "The limit of the function F is α". Finally, with the aid of Theorem 5.28 we find the desired Kripke model K 1 , by assigning an appropriate classical model of T α to the node α. We will show that T α ⊢ ✷ϕ α (Corollary 5.22) and also T α ⊢ ¬✷B ♦ for any α ✷B (Theorem 5.14). In this way, we can simulate the role of modal operator ✷ in the first-order Kripke model K 1 .
Notation. In the rest of this section, we fix the Kripke model K 0 = (K 0 , R 0 , < 0 , V 0 ) and the set S := {B ∈ Sub(Γ) | B ∈ TNNIL}. We also assume that α 0 ∈ K 0 and define
In other words, we add α 0 in the beneath of all the nodes of K 0 .
Definition of the Solovay function
Solovay used some special recursive function (here we call it the Solovay function) to prove the completeness of GL (The Gödel-Löb logic) for arithmetical interpretations in PA (See [Sol76] ). The Solovay function in [Sol76] , is a function G : N −→ X, in which X is a finite partially ordered set ordered by . The recursive definition of G is such that G climbs over X, i.e. G(x) G(x + 1) and moreover, it goes to some new node iff there exists a witness that G would not remain there. More precisely, G(x + 1) = G(x) iff x + 1 be the code of a proof (in PA) for the fact that the limit of the function G is not G(x + 1). Although it is true (in the standard model) that G would not climb over X (i.e. G is a constant function), PA could not prove this fact. In this subsection, we define a similar recursive function (we name it F ) for the proof of our main theorem (Theorem 5.1), and state and prove some of its properties. For technical reasons, we first define the set of all codes of sequences F (0), . . . , F (x) by an arithmetical formula θ(z), and then define φ θ (x, y) := ∃z(lth(z) = x + 1 ∧ θ(z) ∧ẑ = y) as the graph of a function F θ and finally, let F := F θ . It is clear that we can also define θ F (z) from the function F in the following way.
θ F (z :=)∃x(z = F (0), . . . , F (x) )
To be able to speak about K inside HA, we need some conventions. Suppose that K = {α 0 , α 1 , . . . , α k }. Hence for each α ∈ K, there exists a unique index 0 ≤ i ≤ k such that α = α i . We define α to beī (n is n-th numeral in the language of arithmetic, i.e.ī := S i (0)). We may simply use α instead of α, if no confusion is likely. The following notations for arbitrary terms t, s in the language of arithmetic will be used later.
• t ≺ s := α β (t = α ∧ s = β), t s := α≤β (t = α ∧ s = β),
• tRs := αRβ (t = α ∧ s = β),
• ϕ α := B∈S,α ✷B B.
In the following definition, L θ = y as the arithmetical formula equivalent to "The limit of the function F θ is equal to y". Similarly, define α ≺ L θ and so on. and finally, we extend σ to all propositions by interpreting ✷ as provability in HA , i.e., σ θ := σ HA , in which σ HA is defined from σ as in Definition 2.1,
• let g be a recursive function with θ g (z) as the formula ∃x(z = g(0), . . . , g(x) ). We define L g = y, L g ≻ α, L g α, αRL g and σg to be L θg = y, L θg ≻ α, L θg α, αRL θg and σ θg , respectively. Following Berarducci ([Ber90]), we define a primitive recursive function as follows:
Note that r θ (x, y) depends also on a Σ 1 -formula appeared in the subscript of σ. we may omit subscripts of the substitution σ and the function r when no confusion is likely.
A variant of this function was first appeared in [Ber90] , to define Solovay functions for characterizing interpretability logic of PA. It is easy to observe that r(α, x) is always equal or less than x + 1, and r(α, x) ≤ x iff ∃y ≤ xProofPA (y, ¬(L = α ∧ ✷σ F (ϕ α )) ) Now we are in a position to define the Solovay-like function for K. Informally speaking, F : N → K is defined in such a way that fulfils the following conditions. F (0) := α 0 , and (4)
As it is clear from the definition, F is used in its own definition, i.e. we are in a loop. This will be overcomed by the Diagonalization lemma. To be able to define F , we first define θ(z) and then define F (x) = y (the graph of the function F ) as
By Diagonalization lemma (Lemma 3.5), we find a ∆ 0 formula θ(y) such that in which χ(x, y) is defined as disjunction of the following three formulae:
In the above formulae, r(x, y) is r θ (x, y). Now we show that a provably total recursive function F can be defined from θ(y).
Lemma 5.3. The formula θ is ∆ 0 and
• HA 0 ⊢ (lth(y 1 ) = 0 ∧ θ(y 1 * y 2 )) → θ(y 1 ),
• HA 0 ⊢ (θ(y 1 ) ∧ θ(y 2 ) ∧ lth(y 1 ) = lth(y 2 )) → y 1 = y 2 .
• HA 0 ⊢ ∀x∃y(lth(y) = x + 1 ∧ θ(y)).
Proof. It is not difficult to observe that the first part holds by definition of θ in Equation 5. To prove the other parts, it is enough to show HA 0 ⊢ ∀x∃!y(lth(y) = x + 1 ∧ θ(y)), in which !∃, as usual, is the unique existenial quantifier. This can simply be done by induction on x. ✷ Now, let us define φ(x, y) := ∃z(θ(z) ∧ lth(z) = x + 1 ∧ẑ = y). Note that φ(x, y) is actually a ∆ 0 formula. The reason is the following. we can bound existential quantifier by the primitive recursive function h(z) with the following primitive recursive definition:
• h(0) := k , in which k is the number of nodes of Kripke model,
Remark 5.4. The above lemma (Lemma 5.3) says that φ(x, y) is the graph of a ∆ 0 -function F . In the rest of the paper, we use F as a function symbol with the graph φ(x, y). We use σ and L instead of σθ and L θ , respectively. For simplicity of notations, we also define B ♦ := σ(B).
Now one can observe that the function F fulfils the recursive conditions of Equation 4.
Elementary properties of the Solovay function
In this part, we will see some elementary properties of the function F . 3. Proof of this part is an immediate consequence of part 2 and perfectness of K. ✷ Lemma 5.6. For any α, β ∈ K with αRβ,
Proof. We argue inside HA 0 . Assume L = α and ProofPA (x, ¬(L = β ∧ ✷ϕ ♦ β ) ). Let y > x such that (y + 1) 0 = 2, β . Then because L = α, we have F (y) = α. On the other hand, by recursive definition of F , F (y + 1) := β, a contradiction. ✷ Lemma 5.7. For any δ, α, β ∈ K with δRα ≤ β,
Proof. If αRβ, by Lemma 5.6,
and hence by Lemma 3.6, we can deduce HA 0 ⊢ L = α ✄ (L = β ∧ ✷ϕ ♦ β ). So assume α Rβ and α = β. By definition of A ✄ B, we must show
We work inside HA 0 . Assume L = δ and fix some large enough x such that F (x) = δ. Then for each u ≤ x, we have F (u)Rβ. Now work in the scope of ✷ + . By Σ-completeness of PA, we have ∀u ≤ xF (u)Rβ. Assume L = α, ✷ϕ ♦ α and ✷ + x ¬(L = β ∧ ✷ϕ ♦ β ). We should deduce ⊥. By ✷ +
x ¬(L = β ∧ ✷ϕ ♦ β ), for sufficiently large y (larger than 2, β * z, in which z is a proof code in PA x for ¬(L = β ∧ ✷ϕ ♦ β )), we have r(β, y) ≤ x. If r(α, y) ≤ r(β, y), then ✷ + x ¬(L = α ∧ ✷ϕ ♦ α ), and hence by Lemma 3.7, we have ¬(L = α ∧ ✷ϕ ♦ α ), a contradiction. If r(α, y) > r(β, y), since r(β, y) ≤ x, then F (r(β, y))Rβ. So by recursive definition of F , there exists some z ≥ y such that F (z) = β, contradicting L = α. ✷
Deciding the boxed formulas
In this subsection, we will show that HA + L = α + ✷ϕ ♦ α can decide boxed propositions in S. More precisely, for all ✷B ∈ S and α ∈ K,
Note that by definition of ϕ α , if α ✷B, then B is a conjunct of ϕ α . Hence in case α ✷B, we obviously have HA + ✷ϕ ♦ α ⊢ ✷B ♦ . Moreover we will show in subsection 5.4 (Corollary 5.22) that HA ⊢ L = α → ϕ ♦ α for α ∈ K 0 , and then the following improvement of the above equation holds: 
by induction on the complexity of B. Then by Lemma 3.6, we derive its formalized form in HA 0 . ✷ Let A be a TNNIL-formula such that α max A, that means that α A and for all β α, β A. In Lemma 5.11 and Lemma 5.12, we need to put ✷ x before all occurrences of subformulas B in the right of →, when it is not the case that α max B. This is the content of the following definition.
Definition 5.9. Let A be a modal proposition, α ∈ K and x be a variable. We define the firstorder sentence d(A, α, x), with induction on A. If this is not the case that α max A, then we define d(A, α, x) := ✷ x A ♦ , and if α max A, we define the formula d(A, α, x) by cases: In the following lemma, we use definition of σ l (A, x) from subsection 3.3:
Lemma 5.10. Let A be a modal proposition, α ∈ K such that α max A. Then
Proof. By third part of Lemma 3.16, we have HA 0 ⊢ σ l (A, x) → A ♦ . Then the result follows by induction on A. ✷ Lemma 5.11. Let A ∈ S and let α ∈ K such that α max B. Then there exists some provably (in HA) total recursive function g α A such that
Proof. Use Lemma 3.18 and Lemma 5.10. ✷
Define m ∈ ω as the maximum of the following n i 's.
• n 1 . By Lemma 5.11, we can find some n 1 such that for each B ∈ S and α ∈ K with α max B, g α B is provably total in HA n1 . • n 2 . For each α ∈ K, B ∈ S such that α max B, by Lemma 5.11, there exists some n such that HA n proves the desired sentence of the Lemma. Let n 2 be the maximum of such n.
• n 3 . By Lemma 3.12, for each α ∈ K, there exists some provably (in HA) total function h α , such that h α (x) ≥ x and HA ⊢ ✷ hα(
). Hence there exists some n α ∈ ω such that h α is provably total in HA nα and
Then define f α B (x) as the maximum of g α B (x) and m. Assume some B ∈ S. We define the provably (in HA m ) total recursive function f B , by induction on the complexity of B:
where h β is as we stated in defining n 3 . From the above definition, one can observe that for each atomic C ∈ S, the set X is empty. Hence we have f C (x) = x. Since each formula B has some atomic sub-formula C, one can deduce that f B (x) ≥ f β B (x), in which β max B. Moreover, all of the above functions are provably total in HA m .
Lemma 5.12. Let B, E ∈ S and β ∈ K, such that β max B, β max E and B ∈ Sub(E). Then
Proof. We prove Equation 6 by induction on the complexity of B. As induction hypothesis, assume that for any sub-formula C of B (C = B) and any E ′ ∈ S and γ ∈ K, such that C ∈ Sub(E ′ ) and γ max C, E ′ , we have
We consider different cases. 
Hence
By Lemma 5.6, we can deduce HA m ⊢ ¬ L = β ∧ ✷C ♦ . Hence by Lemma 3.6,
, which implies Equation 6.
). Hence, by induction hypothesis,
Then by Lemma 5.8,
Since β max B, either β max C or β max D holds. We only treat the case that β max C. The other case is similar. Assume that β max C. Then by definition, d(B, β, y) = d(C, β, y). Now the induction hypothesis for C, directly implies the desired result (Equation 6).
• B = C ∨ D. This case is the interesting one. We have 4 sub-cases: (1) β max C and β max D, 
So it is enough to show that
Since β D and not β max D, there exists some γ β such that γ max D. If βRγ, then we can repeat the reasoning came in the boxed case. So assume that β Rγ. By the induction hypothesis for D and γ, we have
On the other hand, by Lemma 5.11, we have
We argue inside HA m . Assume F (f E (x))Rβ and ✷
, by the assumption of F (f E (x))Rβ, we have F (f D (f β E (x)))Rγ, and by Lemma 3.6, we get ✷ m (F (f D (f β E (x)))Rγ). Hence if we replace f β E (x) for x in Equation 10, we may deduce
). So there exists some y 1 such that Proof HA t(x) (y 1 , ¬(L = γ ∧ ϕ ♦ γ ) ). Also by L = β, there exists some y 2 ≥ y 1 such that ∀z ≥ y 2 F (z) = β. Let some y greater than 2, γ * y 2 and t(x). If r(β, y
) and we are working in ✷ fE (x) , by Lemma 3.12, we have ¬(L = β ∧ ϕ ♦ β ) and hence ⊥. If t(x) < r(β, y + 1), since r(γ, y + 1) ≤ t(x), by recursive definition of F , then F (y + 1) = γ, which contradicts with L = β.
✷
Corollary 5.13. For each B ∈ S and β ∈ K such that β max B, 
The Solovay function is a constant function
In this subsection, we will show that L = α 0 is a true statement in the standard model (Theorem 5.25). This fact is necessary for showing that for any α ∈ K, the theory L = α + PA is consistent.
Lemma 5.15. For each α β ∈ K with α Rβ,
Proof. By Π 2 conservativity of PA over HA, it is enough to prove the above assertion in PA instead of HA. We work inside PA. Fix some x such that F (x) = α. Then for each y ≤ x, we have F (y) α. Now, work inside ✷ + . Assume L = β and ✷ϕ ♦ β . Then there exists some minimum z such that F (z + 1) = β. So there exists some δ such that F (z) = δ. Since F (x) = α, we have β δ ≥ α. Hence δ Rβ. So by recursive definition of F , r(β, z + 1) < r(δ, z + 1) and F (r(β, z + 1))Rβ. Since α Rβ, we have F (r(β, z + 1)) F (x) = α, which implies r(β, z + 1) < x. Since x ≤ z, we have r(β, z + 1) < z and hence ✷ x ¬(L = β ∧ ✷ϕ ♦ β ). Thus by Lemma 3.7, ¬(L = β ∧ ✷ϕ ♦ β ), that is a contradiction. ✷ Lemma 5.16. For any β ∈ K and B ∈ S,
• if β B and any occurrence of → in B is in the scope of some ✷ (B ∈ NOI), then HA ⊢ (L = β ∧ ✷ϕ ♦ β ) → ¬B ♦ . Proof. We prove the items by induction on the complexity of B. • B is conjunction or disjunction. We have the desired conclusions by the induction hypotheses.
• B = ✷C. First assume β ✷C. Then, by definition of ϕ ♦ β , C ♦ is a conjunct of ϕ ♦ β , and then
For the other side, assume β ✷C. Then Theorem 5.14 implies HA ⊢ L = β → ¬✷C ♦ .
then β D, and hence by the induction hypothesis,
If β C, then again by the induction hypothesis,
✷ Lemma 5.17. Let α ∈ K and for each β ≥ α, we have HA ⊢ βRL → ϕ ♦ β . Then for each β ≥ α and γ β, β Rγ,
Proof. Fix some β ≥ α. We use induction on γ. Suppose that for each γ 0 γ β with β Rγ 0 , we have HA ⊢ ∃xF (x) = β → ✷ + L = γ 0 . Then
hypothesis of lemma and Lemma 3.2
Proof. We work inside PA. Assume ∃xF (x) = γ. There exists a minimum x 0 such that F (x 0 ) = γ.
Then by recursive definition of F , we have F (x) ≺ F (x 0 ), for all x < x 0 , and F (x 0− 1) = β, and one of the following cases holds:
1. βRγ and r(γ, x 0 ) ≤ x 0 , by definition of r, we can deduce
and then ✷ + ¬(L = γ ∧ ✷ϕ ♦ γ ).
2. β Rγ, β ≺ γ and r(γ, x 0 ) < r(β, x 0 ). Because r(β, x 0 ) ≤ x 0 + 1, we can deduce r(γ, x 0 ) ≤ x 0 . By repeating the above argument, we get ✷ + ¬(L = γ ∧ ✷ϕ ♦ γ ).
✷
Lemma 5.19. Let β ∈ K 0 and for each γ ≥ β, we have HA ⊢ γRL → ϕ ♦ γ . Then for each γ ≥ β, we have HA ⊢ ∃xF (x) = γ → ✷ϕ ♦ γ .
Proof. By Lemma 5.18, PA ⊢ ∃xF (x) = γ → ✷ + ¬(L = γ ∧ ✷ϕ ♦ γ ). Then Lemma 3.2 implies
Hence Proof. We prove this by induction on the frame (K, ) with reverse order. Let some γ ≥ β and as the (first) induction hypothesis, assume that for each γ 0 γ and B ∈ S, if γ 0 B, then HA ⊢ ∃xF (x) = γ 0 → B ♦ . We will show that for each B ∈ S, if γ B, then HA ⊢ ∃xF (x) = γ → B ♦ . We prove this by a (second) induction on the complexity of B ∈ S. Let some B ∈ S and γ B and as the (second) induction hypothesis, assume that for each C ∈ S with lower complexity than B (i.e. C is a strict sub-formula of B) such that γ C, we have HA ⊢ ∃xF (x) = γ → C ♦ . We will show HA ⊢ ∃xF (x) = γ → B ♦ . We have following cases.
• B is atomic. It is trivial by definition of B ♦ .
• B is conjunction or disjunction. The result follows easily by (second) induction hypothesis.
• B = ✷C. Suppose that γ ✷C. Then by definition of ϕ γ , we have HA ⊢ ✷ϕ ♦ γ → ✷C ♦ . Now the result is a consequence of Lemma 5.19.
• B = C → D ∈ S and C does not have an occurrence of implication which is not in the scope of any box. Suppose that γ C → D. There are two sub-cases.
On the other hand, C is implication-free and C ♦ is Σ 1 , so by Lemma 3.2, we have HA ⊢ (∃xF (x) = γ ∧ C ♦ ) → L ≻ γ. For arbitrary γ 0 γ, we have γ 0 C → D. So by the first induction hypothesis, we can derive HA ⊢ ∃xF (x) = γ 0 → (C → D) ♦ . By definition of γ ≺ L, we have HA ⊢ γ ≺ L → (C → D) ♦ . Hence HA ⊢ (∃xF (x) = γ ∧ C ♦ ) → (C ♦ → D ♦ ), which implies HA ⊢ ∃xF (x) = γ → (C ♦ → D ♦ ).
Lemma 5.21. For any α ∈ K, HA ⊢ αRL → ϕ ♦ α . Proof. Our proof is by reverse induction on the frame (K, ). As the induction hypothesis, assume that for each β α, we have HA ⊢ βRL → ϕ ♦ β . For each β with αRβ, by definition of ϕ α , we have β ϕ α . Hence by the induction hypothesis and Lemma 5.20, HA ⊢ ∃xF (x) = β → ϕ ♦ α . Then HA ⊢ αRβ ∃xF (x) = β → ϕ ♦ α , which implies HA ⊢ αRL → ϕ ♦ α . ✷
As a direct consequence of Lemma 5.19 and Lemma 5.21 we have the following result. Proof. We should show that N |= (L = α ∧ ϕ ♦ α ) ✄ (L = β ∧ ϕ ♦ β ). This is a direct consequence of Theorem 5.25, Lemma 5.7 and Lemma 5.6. ✷
Proof of the main theorem
In this subsection, we will prove Theorem 5.1.
With the general method of constructing Kripke models for HA, invented by Smoryński [Smo73b] , interpretability of theories containing PA plays an important role in constructing Kripke models of HA.
Definition 5.27. A triple I := (K, <, T ) is called an I-frame iff it has the following properties:
• (K, <) is a finite tree, Example 6.1. Let A = ✷(p ∨ q) → (✷p ∨ ✷q). H. Friedman showed in [Fri75] that there exists some first-order arithmetical formulas B and C such that HA ✷(B ∨ C) → (✷B ∨ ✷C), in other words, there exists some arithmetical substitution σ such that HA σ HA (A). First of all note that the following Kripke model K 0 is a counter-model for A. β p , β q , γ q , γ p and αRβ , αRγ , α ≤ β , α ≤ γ Then by Theorem 5.1, there exists some first-order Kripke model K 1 HA and some Σ 1 -substitution σ such that K 1 σ HA (A). Hence we have HA σ HA (A), in other words, if we define B := σ(p) and C := σ(q), then we have HA ✷(B ∨ C) → (✷B ∨ ✷C). Let us explain a little more about the substitution σ and the Kripke model K 1 in this special example. For definition of σ, we first define a recursive function F in the following way. Let α 0 be a fresh node and add it to the beneath of all other nodes of K 0 , i.e. α 0 R{α, β, γ} and α 0 ≤ {α, β, γ}. Then put F (0) := α 0 and for all x, define F (x + 1) ∈ {α 0 , α, β, γ} recursively as follows: • the function F with the above properties exists,
• for λ ∈ {α, β, γ}, the following theories are consistent:
T λ := PA + "The limit of the function F is λ"
• T λ ⊢ ϕ λ and also T α ⊢ ¬✷σ(p) and T α ⊢ ¬✷σ(q),
• T λ1 interprets T λ2 , for all α 1 ≤ α 2 .
Then we define the Kripke model K 1 with the same frame of K 0 , such that the classical model attached to the node λ, M λ , be a model of T λ . Since T λ1 interprets T λ2 , for all α 1 ≤ α 2 , we can deduce K 1 HA. This in combination with the above list of properties for F , implies that K 1 simulates the behaviour of K 0 , i.e. for arbitrary B ∈ Sub(A):
Example 6.2. In this example, we show that how to refute A = ¬¬✷(¬¬p → p) → ✷(¬¬p → p) from the provability logic of HA and also from the Σ 1 -provability logic of HA. First we compute the TNNIL-approximation of A, i.e. A + . By TNNIL-algorithm (subsubsection 4.1.3), A + = ✷(p ∨ ¬p) ∨ ¬✷(p ∨ ¬p). Then we have the following counter-model K 0 for A + : A + . Then by Theorem 5.1, we can find some Σ 1 -substitution σ and some first-order Kripke model K 1 , such that K HA and K σ HA (A + ). Hence HA σ HA (A + ). Now Corollary 4.8.1 implies HA σ HA (A), as desired. ✷
Although the axioms of the theory H σ sounds very complicated, however we have the following surpring result. Theorem 6.5. Σ 1 -provability logic of HA (H σ ) is decidable.
Proof. Let A be a given modal proposition. We explain how to decide H σ ⊢ A or H σ A. First by TNNIL algorithm, compute A + . Then by Theorem 4.26, we can decide LC ⊢ A + . If LC ⊢ A + , we say 'yes" to H σ ⊢ A, and otherwise we say "no" to H σ ⊢ A. Proof of the completeness theorem (Theorem 6.4) guarantees validity of the algorithm. ✷ Theorem 6.6. HA + ✷⊥ has the de Jongh property, i.e. for all non-modal proposition A, IPC ⊢ A iff for all arithmetical substitution σ, HA + ✷⊥ ⊢ σ(A).
Proof. If IPC ⊢ A, we apparently have HA ⊢ σ(A), for all σ, and hence HA + ✷⊥ ⊢ σ(A).
For the other way around, let IPC A. Hence by Theorem 4.4.1, IPC A * . Then by Theorem 4.27, LC ✷⊥ → A * . This implies that LLe + ✷⊥ → A * . Hence by Theorem 5.1, there exists some substitution σ such that HA + ✷⊥ σ(A), as desired.
✷
